

**RMA**

# **A REVIEW OF RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACHES RELEVANT TO TERRORISM AND RADICALISATION**

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**REDUCING  
SERIOUS HARM**

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**REBECCA WAGSTAFF (RESEARCH OFFICER)**

Rebecca joined the RMA in 2020 as a Research Officer. Rebecca has a degree in Speech and Language Therapy and moved to Scotland to complete an MSc in the Psychology of Language. Rebecca recently completed a PhD.



**RACHEL WEBB (DEVELOPMENT LEAD)**

Rachel joined the RMA in 2015 as an Order for Lifelong Restriction (OLR) Case Worker after graduating with an MSc in Forensic Psychology. Rachel is currently the Development Lead where she has oversight and management of development projects in relation to the RMA's strategic aims. Rachel has published work on the OLR, Internet Offending, Trauma and the use of the LS/CMI in Scotland.



**GEOFF TORDZRO-TAYLOR  
(HEAD OF DEVELOPMENT)**

Geoff joined the RMA in 2017, working on training initiatives and standards and guidelines. He qualified as a Chartered Psychologist and Registered Forensic Psychologist in 2019. He is currently the Head of Development where he has strategic responsibility for research, development and evaluation functions.

# LIST OF ACRONYMS

**CVE** - Countering Violent Extremism

**DDP** - Desistance and Disengagement Programme

**HII** - Healthy Identity Intervention

**HIIF** - Healthy Identity Intervention: Foundation

**HIIP** - Healthy Identity Intervention: Plus

**MEI** - Motivational and Engagement Intervention

**RAN** - Radicalisation Awareness Network

**UNODC** - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

# 1. INTRODUCTION

1. Largely in response to two terrorism-related incidents that occurred in the UK between late 2019 and early 2020, the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 was devised (Law Society of Scotland, n.d.). The Bill (which, at the time of writing, was approaching Committee stage within the House of Lords; UK Parliament) will – amongst other things – increase both the time individuals convicted of terrorism-related offences spend in prison and the period under which they are subject to licence conditions upon return to the community (Law Society of Scotland, n.d.; Ministry of Justice [UK], n.d. [a]).
2. As Hall (2020a) outlines, the proposed prioritisation of a fixed, determinate sentence (the Serious Terrorism Sentence) in the case of terrorism-related offences (outside of those for which a life sentence is warranted) presents specific practical considerations in Scotland due to the sentencing options available. Specifically, this refers to the Order for Lifelong Restriction (OLR): a sentence unique to Scotland imposed on the basis of an individual's risk, rather than the index offence(s) for which they have been convicted *per se*<sup>1</sup>. When an OLR is imposed, a 'punishment' part, determining the minimum period for which the individual will remain in custody, is set. What happens at the end of this period – i.e., whether the period in custody is extended or the individual is granted conditional release – is at the discretion of the Parole Board for Scotland, according to the risk to public safety the individual poses. As it currently stands, an individual convicted of a terrorism-related offence could receive an OLR, the period in custody of which – due to the processes previously outlined – could in reality be longer than the determinate sentence proposed within the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill. Thus, as Hall (2020a) discusses, if it is the case that the determinate sentence outlined within the Bill must be prioritised, it could result in an individual remaining in custody for a shorter period than they would have been under the OLR, due to the inflexibility of the sentence. In other words, prioritising the serious terrorism sentence would in effect mean ruling out the OLR which, as a *de facto* life sentence, provides greater public protective utility because it has no end date<sup>2</sup>. This has since been raised within the Public Bill Committee (UK, 2020) and an amendment to the Bill tabled, with it specifying that the punishment part of any OLR given in such circumstances should carry a punishment part of at least 14 years (Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill, As Amended, 2020; see also Brader & Winchester, 2020).
3. Whilst remaining a small percentage of the overall population, across ten European countries covered within a recent report (Basra & Neumann, 2020a)<sup>3</sup> it was reported that the number of individuals in prison convicted of a terrorism-related offence has risen noticeably over the past few years. And, with the introduction of longer sentencing, one could anticipate these numbers increasing further in the UK<sup>4</sup> over the coming years. This, in turn, presents a number of challenges for both prison and community-based criminal justice services: indeed as Kessels (2017, p. 2) acutely observes, "...the perceived challenges are many and the tolerance for failure is extremely low". Whilst perhaps primary amongst these concerns is continued plotting and activity within prison amongst those serving sentences (for useful discussion regarding this point, see Basra & Neumann, 2020a, Chapter 3) and the risk of the radicalisation of other inmates, also of pressing importance is consideration of the successful reintegration of individuals convicted of terrorism-related offences into society, upon their release. Such concerns and considerations also extend to individuals currently held within prison who do not have a conviction of terrorism-related offences but are showing signs of radicalisation (Basra & Neumann, 2020; Radicalisation Awareness Network [RAN], 2019).

<sup>1</sup> Please note this does not apply to convictions of murder, for which a life sentence would be given. For detailed information regarding the OLR and associated processes, see [www.rma.scot/order-for-lifelong-restriction](http://www.rma.scot/order-for-lifelong-restriction).

<sup>2</sup> Indeed, as part of his discussion, Hall (2020a) outlines that "this also raises the question of whether a more flexible, indeterminate sentence, such as the Order for Lifelong Restriction, is not preferable generally to the inflexibility of a serious terrorism sentence" (p. 2).

<sup>3</sup> See also Basra & Neumann (2020b) for detailed reports regarding each of the 10 European Countries

<sup>4</sup> Because Counter-Terrorism is reserved, the changes will apply to all three jurisdictions across the UK: England & Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland (Ministry of Justice [UK], n.d.[a] - see also, Hall, 2020a). It should be noted however that, according to the tabled amendment (Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill As Amended, 2020), the Serious Terrorism Sentence will not be imposed if the individual has been made subject to an Order for Lifelong Restriction.

4. Before moving on to the focus of this review – which is a discussion of the various ‘de-radicalisation’ programmes developed and utilised across the globe – brief attention will be paid to three aspects of broader prison management. Whilst not central to the discussion here, they are acknowledged to provide a solid grounding for the successful running of tailored interventions (see Vidino & Clifford, 2019 for discussion) and are therefore considered worthy of mention. The three aspects are the placement of prisoners, the relationship between staff and individuals involved in offending, and the importance of staff training. This discussion is followed by a brief overview of the de-radicalisation programmes used with individuals involved in violent extremism and terrorism offences in the UK context.

## PRISON MANAGEMENT

### PLACEMENT OF PRISONERS

5. Although described using somewhat variable terminology, the following main approaches to the placement of individuals involved in violent extremism and terrorism offences within prisons are evident:
  - *Segregation/Containment/Concentration* (Basra & Neumann, 2020a; Copeland & Marsden, 2020; RAN, 2019; Silke & Veldhuis, 2017) – Individuals are separated and housed in a separate part of the prison or separate facility. The regimes followed may be analogous to those followed within the ‘main’ prison, or unique to the facility (depending on the needs of the individuals and the risks they may present).
  - *Dispersal* (Basra & Neumann, 2020a; Copeland & Marsden, 2020; RAN, 2019; Silke & Veldhuis, 2017) – Individuals remain within the main prison and are ‘dispersed’ amongst the general population.
  - *Isolation* (Basra & Neumann, 2020a) – Individuals are again housed separately from the general prison population however as the name would suggest, are additionally kept in isolation from one another.
6. A mixed or combined approach – merging elements from both the segregation and dispersal models – has also been adopted within a number of countries (Basra & Neumann, 2020a; Copeland & Marsden, 2020). Under this model, individuals considered to be particularly high risk may be separated from the general prison population, whilst the remainder are dispersed amongst it (Copeland & Marsden, 2020). How this mixed approach works in practice varies between countries. In France, for example, individuals are initially all held together (in a designated unit) and, over a 4-month period, assessed by a multi-disciplinary team (Rougier & Micheron, Chapter 4 in Basra & Neumann, 2020b). From there, individuals are allocated either to typical detention, to a prison which has specialist input available or to a separate unit (Rougier & Micheron, Chapter 4 in Basra & Neumann, 2020b). In England and Wales, three separation centres have been formed of which, as far as can be established, one – HMP Frankland – is currently operational (Goldberg, 2020). Entry into these separation centres<sup>5</sup> is through a process of referral which, amongst other factors, relies on at least one of the following criteria being met (HM Prison and Probation Service, 2017):
  - a) *in the interests of national security;*
  - b) *to prevent the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism, a terrorism offence, or an offence with a terrorist connection, whether in prison or otherwise;*
  - c) *to prevent the dissemination of views or beliefs that might encourage or induce others to commit any such act or offence, whether in prison or otherwise, or to protect or safeguard others from such views or beliefs; or*

<sup>5</sup> The implementation of separation centres in England and Wales has recently been subject to a process study; see Powis, Wilkinson, Bloomfield & Randhawa-Horne (2019).

d) to prevent any political, religious, racial or other views or beliefs being used to undermine good order and discipline in a prison (p.4).

7. There is, as might be expected, advantages and drawbacks to the segregation and dispersal approaches. Whilst separating individuals involved in violent extremism and terrorism offences may bring with it the advantage of reducing the likelihood of the radicalisation of other prisoners, mixing with other prisoners affords violent extremist and terrorist prisoners the opportunity to be amongst and converse with individuals who hold an alternative world view (see Copeland & Marsden, 2020 and RAN, 2019 for further discussion regarding the benefits and disadvantages of each approach). This, in a sense, neatly describes the balancing act faced by prisons – on the one hand the need to manage the risk of the radicalisation of other prisoners and on the other the goal of rehabilitating individuals involved in violent extremism and terrorism offences such that, upon release from prison, they are able to successfully reintegrate into society and the risk of recidivism is reduced (Veldhuis & Lindenberg, 2012 – see also Copeland & Marsden, 2020). Evidence regarding which model is the most effective is currently limited and, in any respect, would likely depend on local context (e.g., practical factors such as resource availability and prison autonomy; Copeland & Marsden, 2020; Silke & Veldhuis, 2017).
8. Whilst it goes without saying that fair and humane treatment should be extended to all individuals<sup>6</sup>, such treatment may be particularly significant for individuals involved in violent extremism and terrorism offences, whose trust in the state may be extremely low and who therefore may be expecting to be treated badly (Kessels, 2017). In turn, the development of good relationships with prison staff may further influence their view of the state and those in positions of authority (RAN, 2019), as well as presenting opportunities for broader shifts in thinking (Global Counterterrorism Forum, 2012).

## **RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STAFF AND INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN TERRORISM**

9. Within their work looking at the implementation of a de-radicalisation programme in Nigeria, Barkindo and Bryans (2016, p. 21) reflect that *"The professional conduct of prison personnel in delivering de-radicalisation programmes can have a significant impact on the degree of trust that violent extremists have in their government"*<sup>7</sup>. That is not to say – as somewhat reflected on by a practitioner interviewed as part of a study conducted by Cherney (2020; interviewee 023, pp. 24-25) – however that the building of good relationships is an easy or straightforward task, and the importance of supporting staff to develop not only their interpersonal skills but also their resilience has been highlighted (Copeland and Marsden, 2020). Furthermore, as Chapman (2018, p. 16) reflects upon following the implementation of a rehabilitation programme with Loyalist prisoners in Northern Ireland, hearing individuals talk about the violence with which they have previously been involved can be extremely challenging for staff, requiring in this instance both *"...the support of colleagues and a thorough and honest debriefing after each session"*. It is of vital importance therefore that staff working with individuals involved in violent extremism and terrorism offences are not only offered appropriate training, but are also provided ongoing access to appropriate support networks (RAN, 2019; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2016, Chapter 6).

<sup>6</sup> In line with Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (see <https://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=basictexts&c>): "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment".

<sup>7</sup> See also Copeland & Marsden (2020) for related discussion and suggested good practice for staff in establishing good relationships with violent extremist and terrorist offenders <sup>8</sup> See also Global Counterterrorism Forum (2012) and RAN (2019)

## STAFF TRAINING

10. The importance of adequate training for staff working with individuals involved in violent extremism and terrorism offences is referred to and discussed widely across the literature (e.g. Basra & Neumann, 2020a; Global Counterterrorism Forum, 2012; RAN, 2019; UNODC, 2016, Chapter 6; Vidino & Clifford, 2019). Indeed, the UNODC (2016, Chapter 6) suggest extending the provision of more general information sessions to all staff, with the aim of creating an overall prison environment which is conducive to rehabilitation and the effective implementation of targeted interventions<sup>8</sup>. All training should be responsive both to the needs of the staff receiving it and the evolving evidence base (RAN, 2019). Providing some combined training to prison, probation and other criminal justice services staff could also be considered and may additionally afford the opportunity for staff to learn about each other's roles (RAN, 2019).
11. Amongst other factors<sup>9</sup>, important within training might be providing staff with the skills to accurately differentiate between religious belief and adherence and radicalisation, and the ability to recognise how the ideological beliefs of a broad spectrum of individuals involved in violent extremism and terrorism offences may manifest (Copeland & Marsden, 2020). In relation to the first point, as well as the possibility that the misinterpretation of religious belief and adherence for radicalisation could lead to the individuals concerned feeling as if they were being discriminated against (Copeland & Marsden, 2020). Work reviewed by Silke and Veldhuis (2017) additionally suggests that religion may bring with it positive benefits for individuals in prison<sup>10</sup> and so staff need to be able to distinguish between religious belief, and radicalisation. In relation to distinguishing between ideologies, Copeland & Marsden (2020) raised the concern that because we are currently limited in our understanding of behaviours linked to right-wing extremism, there is the potential that such behaviours may unwittingly be accepted by prison staff – which could in turn be interpreted by other individuals involved in offending to reflect a kind of favouritism towards certain individuals, and discrimination against them.

<sup>8</sup> See also Global Counterterrorism Forum (2012) and RAN (2019)

<sup>9</sup> For further discussion regarding training requirements, see RAN (2019)

<sup>10</sup> For additional discussion relating to this point, see also RAN (2019)



## UK TERRORISM STRATEGY: DE-RADICALISATION PROGRAMMES

12. Provided in the following paragraphs is a brief overview of the tertiary programmes currently employed in the UK context. In England and Wales, the Motivational and Engagement Intervention (MEI) and the Healthy Identity Intervention (HII) were piloted in 2010 and 2011 (Dean, Lloyd, Keane, Powis & Randhawa, 2018). Following recommendation these programmes have since been amalgamated into a two-strand programme, collectively referred to as HII (Dean et al., 2018). The programme is specifically designed to be flexible, with facilitators given the autonomy to shape delivery according to the identified risks and needs of the individual (Dean, 2014). Both delivered on a 1:1 basis, the Foundation (HIIF) strand is divided into three modules – Engagement & insight, Mindfulness Sessions and Moving On – and the Plus strand (HIIP) into seven – Foundation Sessions, Personal Identity, Group Involvement, Self-Image, Group Conflict, Seeking Change, and Concluding Sessions (Dean, 2014).
13. Another rehabilitation programme utilised is the Desistance and Disengagement Programme (DDP). DDP sits within the Prevent strand of the UK's Contest Strategy and relates to the third objective within the strand, to *"Enable those who have already engaged in terrorism to disengage and rehabilitate"* (HM Government, 2018, p. 31). The programme was initially provided to those on probation, before being expanded into prisons in 2018 (Home Office Factsheet, 2018) and can be found described as supplementing HII (Brader, 2020). In the community setting, involvement in DDP may be mandatory, as part of an individual's conditions (HM Government, 2018; Home Office [UK], 2019). Little specific information regarding exactly what the programme entails is provided within the Contest Strategy<sup>11</sup>, however the programme is described as providing *"...a range of intensive tailored interventions and practical support..."* (HM Government, 2018, p. 40), with it outlined that *"Support could include mentoring, psychological support, theological and ideological advice"* (HM Government, 2018, p. 40).
14. Upon request, further information regarding DDP was provided to the review authors from colleagues working within Prevent<sup>12</sup>. Within prison, DDP is made up of two strands - the first concerned with theological intervention and mentoring and the second with psychological intervention. The first strand includes input from trained Chaplains, Imams, and mentors, either linked directly to the DDP programme (i.e., from the group of DDP intervention providers) or from another body of intervention providers. The psychological strand is concerned both with training psychologists to be able to conduct necessary individual assessment and with the provision of intervention programmes (including HII). At the present time, DDP is only delivered in England and Wales, with discussion currently ongoing with Prevent Scotland regarding what provision is required in Scotland. As it currently stands, a small number of psychologists have been trained to conduct individual assessments in Scotland, and Scotland has access to the pool of mentors and intervention providers working within England and Wales.
15. Also relevant to refer to here is the recently updated Statutory Guidance for Scotland regarding the duties arising from Section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (Home Office, Upd. Apr 2021). Specifically, Section 26 of the aforementioned Act outlines that specified authorities must *"...in the exercise of their functions, [have] "due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism""* (Home Office, Upd. Apr 2021, Para. 1)<sup>13</sup>. This duty is encompassed within the previously mentioned Prevent strategy, which itself sits within the UK's Contest Strategy<sup>14</sup>. In Scotland, the Multi-Agency Strategic Contest Board (MASCB) oversees work/action relating to Contest, under which sits a sub-group concerned specifically with Prevent. Multi-agency, local level groups are also in place, which oversee activity in the relevant local area (Home Office, Upd. Apr 2021).

<sup>11</sup> The limited information available regarding the exact nature of DDP has been reported within the UK media (Grierson, 2019)

<sup>12</sup> Particular thanks are extended to Lee-Anne Houston, Safeguarding and Vulnerability Team Leader in the Connected Communities Unit of Scottish Government, for sharing her expertise regarding DDP with the RMA.

<sup>13</sup> Full detail of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 can be found at <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/6/contents/enacted>

<sup>14</sup> Please note that this guidance (Home Office, Upd April 2021) references the Prevent Strategy published in 2011 and, as such, does not include the objective to *"enable those who have already engaged in terrorism to disengage and rehabilitate"* (HM Government, 2018, p. 31) referred to on the previous page of this review.

16. Whilst, as outlined within the guidance, exactly how organisations fulfil the duty laid out within Section 26 will vary depending on a number of individual factors, the themes of partnership working and effective leadership are common across sectors (Home Office, Upd. Apr 2021). Highlighted, for example, is the importance of establishing (local level) data sharing agreements as required and of ensuring both that staff have the necessary training to understand radicalisation and the local resources available and – from the somewhat reverse perspective – that those in positions of leadership provide to staff the information necessary to allow the duty to be effectively implemented (Home Office, Upd. Apr 2021).
17. Within the context of the Scottish Prison Service (SPS) specifically it is outlined that, when an individual is assessed as potentially being at risk “...from being drawn into any form of extremist ideology or terrorism...” (Para. 78), contact should be made with the intelligence unit within the prison. To enable an accurate understanding/intelligence picture of the individual to be developed (which, by extension, will feed into management), prison staff involved with the individual in question are expected to contribute any relevant information/concerns as they arise, through the appropriate channel. This is in addition to any intelligence sharing agreements in place with external organisations, as appropriate (Home Office, Upd, Apr 2021).
18. With regard to ongoing support and management, the guidance outlines the following:
- A raft of intervention measures will be available: it may be appropriate, for example, to provide theological, motivational and behavioural interventions, or provide them with mentoring. Key Interventions should be developed to ensure that prisoners who present as a threat to radicalisation or who have been identified as having been radicalised can access 1:1 or group work interventions to meet their assessed need. In some cases additional management actions may be required and could include moving the individual away from those he or she is seeking to influence including separation from the wider prison regime (Para. 83).*
19. Upon transition into the community (as part of the consideration of risks that need to be managed – i.e., within the process and creation of an individual's risk management plan) the expectation that, as appropriate, utilisation of the Prevent Professional Concerns (PPC) process be considered is outlined. And, if required, a “...referral to PPC made at the earliest opportunity” (Home Office, Upd, Apr 2021, Para. 85).
20. To date, no outcome evaluation has been published for either DDP or HII; a fact highlighted within the media following the London Bridge attack in 2019 (Shaw, 2019)<sup>15</sup>. It was indicated within the process evaluation of the MEI and HII programme published in 2018 (the findings of which are covered in detail later in this review) that an impact evaluation was being developed, however no time scale was indicated. The planned review of Prevent – within which the DDP programme sits – has been delayed, with currently available information suggesting that a non-statutory aim of completing the review by August 2021 has been set (Ministry of Justice [UK], n.d.[b]). An amendment put forward to include a clause within the Bill requiring the Government to conduct a review into the impact of the Bill on the de-radicalisation programmes carried out within prisons (see Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill, As Amended, 2020) was defeated at division and consequently has not been added to the Bill (Brader & Winchester, 2020).
21. A recent review of MAPPA arrangements for Terrorist Risk Offenders in England and Wales (Hall, 2020b) made a number of both legislative and non-legislative recommendations to which the Government responded in December 2020 (Ministry of Justice [UK] and Home Office [UK], 2020). Amongst the proposed changes was the creation of a fourth MAPPA category (Category 4) to ensure that all individuals convicted of terrorism offences – and individuals whose convicted offence did not relate to terrorism, but who are considered to present a terrorism risk, due for example to radicalisation within prison – are managed through MAPPA (Hall, 2020b; Ministry of Justice [UK] and Home Office [UK], 2020). It was outlined within the Government response that such changes would be implemented in the New Year of 2021 (Ministry of Justice [UK] and Home Office [UK], 2020).

<sup>15</sup> For conversation regarding tertiary programmes employed within the UK and re-radicalisation more broadly, see Goldberg (2020)

## 2. METHODOLOGY

22. This review draws on information from a variety of sources, including a number retrieved from the 'grey' literature<sup>16</sup>. It should be noted that wherever 'the literature' is mentioned throughout this review, it refers collectively to both these 'conventional' (i.e., published through traditional means, such as journals) and grey literature sources. The vast majority of (if not all) sources utilised are either Open Access and/or available through Research Gate, Academia.edu or University Repositories. A link to all such sources has been provided in the Reference List.
23. To identify the information sources utilised, a two-pronged approach was taken. Searches were initially conducted within academic databases/search engines (i.e., PsycINFO and Google Scholar) journal publishers' websites and the NHS Education for Scotland and Social Services Knowledge Scotland library facility. Search terms were devised, refined and briefly tested by searching databases. Boolean operators and truncation were utilised as appropriate to target the search. A similar search was conducted within Google to identify grey literature.
24. A 'snowballing' type approach was additionally adopted: both through the retrieval of relevant resources cited within sources already retrieved and through searching for other papers which had cited resources already obtained, using the 'Cited by' function within Google Scholar. Language and date restrictions were applied to limit the search to English language articles published between 1990 and 2020.
25. Whilst this is a standalone review, it was undertaken at the same time as a review examining risk assessment approaches relevant to terrorism and radicalisation.
26. Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) efforts can be found categorised along three levels: primary (actions that focus on prevention), secondary (actions focused towards individuals considered to be at risk of further radicalisation and involvement in violent extremism) and tertiary (actions that are focused towards those who have been involved in violent extremism, and that aim to cease such involvement, Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, 2019; Gielen, 2018). This review – as outlined within the introductory section – is concerned with action that would fall under the category of tertiary prevention: in other words, action which is targeted towards individuals who have been involved with violent extremism and aims to de-radicalise, disengage, rehabilitate and/or support them in reintegrating into society (Gielen, 2018). An initial search was consequently run to establish the range of terminology used to describe such actions, and it was these that formed the basis of the search.
27. The review has been divided into three sections: the first concerned with interventions implemented within prisons, the second focussed on support and supervision within the community, and the third discussing proposed means through which outcomes can be measured.

<sup>16</sup> That is, literature produced outside of standard academic and commercial research and publishing institutions. Examples include some Government papers, working papers, organisational reports etc.

### 3. INTERVENTIONS WITHIN PRISONS

28. An argument made for longer sentencing proposed within the recent Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill is the increased period of time it provides individuals to engage with rehabilitation efforts (Law Society of Scotland, n.d.; Ministry of Justice [UK], n.d.[a]). As touched upon with the introductory section, whilst valid concerns regarding radicalisation within prison cannot be ignored, the potential for prisons to also – as the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (2012, p.1) neatly describe – “...*present opportunities for positive change*”, should not be overlooked. In 2012, the Forum published a set of ‘good practice guidelines’, comprising a series of recommendations from which specialist programmes for individuals involved in violent extremism and terrorism offences could be initially or further developed. It should be stressed that both within this, and a variety of other available documents (e.g. El-Said, 2012; UNODC, 2016, Chapter 5) the necessity for programmes to be tailored to the broader context within which they are taking place has been highlighted. Further, the importance, too, of acknowledging and responding to the diversity amongst individuals involved in violent extremism and terrorism offences within any given country or state has also been recognised (e.g. Dean, 2017; RAN, 2019).
29. The change that has been seen in the size of the population of individuals involved in violent extremism and terrorism offences across 10 European Countries has already been highlighted, however the data previously referred to (Basra & Neumann, 2020a) would suggest that it isn’t just the size of the population that has altered, but its composition. Figures would suggest, for example, that the number of women convicted on terrorist charges has increased in recent years, with an additional rise seen in the number of individuals convicted of offences relating to far right extremism (Basra & Neumann, 2020a)<sup>17</sup>. Further, across both the EU and the US the average age of incarcerated individuals identified as jihadist has fallen (Vidino & Clifford, 2019). This is particularly interesting to consider in relation to the reflection provided by a number of practitioners working in New South Wales, Australia (Cherney, 2020). They observed what was described as “...*two distinct Muslim cohorts...*” (Cherney, 2020, p. 25). The first, who tended to have been in prison for a number of years, was described as being older, often linked with Al-Qaeda and driven strongly by ideological beliefs. In contrast the second (described as “the Islamic State Cohort”) cohort were younger, more likely to have mental health difficulties or to have been previously involved in crime and often with a limited knowledge or understanding of Islam (Cherney, 2020). This reflection somewhat mirrors discussions found elsewhere in the literature (e.g. Dean 2017; Horgan & Altier, 2012; Silke, 2011) regarding the differences in motivation which can present amongst individuals involved in violent extremism and terrorism offences and – importantly – the fact that not all individuals will necessarily harbour radical views or their offending be driven by ideological belief. In sum – as quoted from the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (2012, p. 5) – “*The bottom line is that different categories of prisoners may require different strategies according to the risk indicators identified in the course of their assessment*”.
30. Interventions can differ in relation to whether they are aiming for de-radicalisation per se (as indicated through a cognitive change) or disengagement (as indicated through a change in behaviour)<sup>18</sup>, however where they are united is in the desire to “...*reduce re-engagement in terrorism*” (Horgan & Braddock, 2010, p. 280). Whilst an in depth exploration of the theoretical discussion regarding these concepts is beyond the remit of this review, the UNODC’s (2016, Chapter 5) position on the matter is important to note. They favour the use of intervention programmes that aim for disengagement – in other words, the rejection of violence as a justified

<sup>17</sup> In Great Britain (i.e., England & Wales, and Scotland), the total number of individuals held in prison on terrorism related offences (including those on remand) has – with the exception of a slight drop between 2018-2019 – increased over the past 7 years (from March 31st 2013- March 31st 2020). When looking at individual groupings, a noticeable rise in the number of individuals classified as ‘extreme right wing’ occurred between 31st March 2017 and 31st March 2018, with the figures continuing to increase to 31st March 2020. In contrast, the number of individuals identified as Islamist Extremist fell slightly between 31st March 2018 and 31st March 2019 and, whilst rising slightly between 31st March 2019 and 31st March 2020, was still below the figure recorded in March 2018 (data retrieved from data table P.01, accessed via Home Office [UK], 2020, p. 18).

<sup>18</sup> For further discussion regarding de-radicalisation vs disengagement, see Silke, (2011)

means through which objectives can be met – both because they are of the opinion that such an aim is more likely to be achieved, but also taking into account a conclusion from the United Nations Human Rights Committee (2003, as cited in UNODC, 2016, p. 71) that:

*...a domestic "ideology conversion system", which was applied in a discriminatory fashion with a view to altering the political opinion of an inmate by offering inducements of preferential treatment within prison and improved possibilities of parole, had violated the freedom of expression and of the manifestation of belief on the discriminatory basis of political opinion (p. 71)*

31. Such disengagement interventions may – the UNODC (2016, Chapter 5, p. 75) outline – include a variety of aspects such as *"...psychological counselling and support; cognitive-behavioural programmes; social work interventions; faith-based debate and dialogue<sup>19</sup>; education; vocational training; creative therapies; physical therapies (e.g. yoga, sport, exercise); family activity; and social, cultural and recreation."*
32. Such a broad and multi-disciplinary approach is advocated by the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (2012), taking into account as it does the wide range of factors that may have lead an individual to commit the offence for which they were imprisoned. There is (perhaps unsurprisingly) a noticeable overlap between the aspects which may be included within interventions for individuals involved in violent extremism and terrorism offences and those employed with individuals convicted of 'typical' offending (UNODC, 2016, Chapter 5). The primary difference is the inclusion of a religious or ideological element to the intervention, carrying the aim for example *"... to challenge justifications for violence based on an interpretation of a religious document"* (UNODC, 2016, Chapter 5, p. 77).
33. As a recent report looking at the management of individuals involved in violent extremism and terrorism offences across 10 European Countries (Basra & Neumann, 2020a) highlights, not all countries have chosen to include specific ideological components within their intervention programmes – Sweden being one such example (Basra & Neumann, 2020a&b). Other differences that appeared when the programmes from these same 10 European Countries were compared related to whether such programmes were compulsory or voluntary, and in the use and scope of mentoring schemes (Basra & Neumann, 2020a).
34. Currently, there is limited evidence regarding the effectiveness of interventions for individuals involved in violent extremism and terrorism offences (as is acknowledged within the literature, e.g. Basra & Neumann, 2020a; Silke & Veldhuis, 2017). Evaluating such outcomes is not an easy task – employing experimental conditions is difficult (e.g. Cherney & Belton, 2019a) and this naturally makes it difficult to categorically conclude that the outcomes seen are linked to the implementation of the programme, as opposed to any external or interacting factors. Furthermore as Gielen (2018) discusses, the aim isn't necessarily about finding out what programme works best per se, but in gaining a theoretical understanding of what works for whom, in what situation. These difficulties, and some of the proposed methods to measure outcomes, are explored further in a forthcoming section. Before that, an overview of studies which have either attempted to measure the effectiveness of the programme employed in some way or considered and reflected upon the process and delivery of an intervention programme are presented<sup>20</sup>. This discussion has been organised according to country. It should be noted that whilst all programmes relate to individuals who are detained in some way, not all are in prisons per se. The exact location has been made clear in each instance.

<sup>19</sup> The need for care to be taken when designing the content of such interventions is made clear by the UNODC – their full discussion will not be reiterated here, but the reader is directed to Section 5.7 of their report (UNODC, 2016, Chapter 5, pp. 83 – 86). See also Akbarzadeh (2013) for useful discussion and reflection regarding the separation of state and religion.

<sup>20</sup> This section has prioritised studies which have collected and reported on first hand data. Two example papers not included here but which may be of interest to the reader are Boucek (2008) and Tan (2019) which provide an overview and consideration of the programmes employed within Saudi Arabia and Malaysia respectively. Both refer to effectiveness as measured through recidivism figures. Additionally, the papers by Akbarzadeh (2013) and Thompson (2018) looking at programmes within Australia, may also be of interest – particularly the enclosed discussion regarding concerns about the narrow focus of the programme employed within Victoria.

## UNITED KINGDOM

### ENGLAND & WALES (DEAN ET AL., 2018)

35. At the time of this process evaluation, two interventions were employed in England & Wales: Motivational and Engagement Intervention (MEI) and the Healthy Identity Intervention (HII). These models were built on 'general' theoretical approaches to addressing offending (such as the principles of Risk-Need-Responsivity, the Good Lives Model and Desistance) with additional elements – such as identity development and mindfulness – incorporated in response to the specific needs of individuals involved in extremism offences. In total, 33 individuals took part in the programme, 22 of whom agreed to be interviewed and provide feedback regarding the programme for the purpose of their study. Fourteen of the group of 22 included within the study were affiliated with Al-Qaeda, with the remainder a mix of extreme right wing, animal rights extremist, other political group extremist or gang affiliation. Staff involved with delivering the programme were also interviewed.
36. Generally, feelings about the programmes were positive – both from staff and the individuals who had participated within it – and the approach adopted indicated to “...*positively target cognitive rigidity around [political and religious] beliefs*” (p. 4). That being said, participants also supported the idea of incorporating specific interventions targeting individuals’ ideologically related needs into the programme (where such needs are relevant), alongside those addressing psychosocial-issues more broadly – leading to the recommendation of adopting a twin track approach for some participants. It was also recognised that the programme might not be suitable for everyone, depending on the characteristics of their offending. Barriers to involvement were identified, and appeared to centre on the timing of the intervention and advice given by solicitors. Also raised was the overlap evident between the two programmes, leading to the recommendation that they be amalgamated.
37. As the authors outline the study has its limitations: the number of feedback forms returned was low, and there is the potential for bias in the method employed, as those who were either the most pleased or displeased with the programme may have been most inclined to respond. Bearing that in mind, from the responses collated it appears that the individuals involved who were involved in extremism offences found the motivational style of the programme helpful and the relationship that it enabled them to develop with staff key to their change process.

### NORTHERN IRELAND (CHAPMAN, 2018)

38. This approach was developed and trialled by a research group in Northern Ireland. The team, having been contacted by the government, set out “...*to find an approach that enables politically motivated prisoners to examine their behaviour critically and to develop a method of facilitation that will engage them in this critical reflection*” (p. 6). The focus was reintegration, with the overall aim of the programme being to enable individuals, upon their release, to reintegrate successfully into society. The sessions, underpinned by a theoretical framework developed by Shadd Maruna and built around Scharmer’s (2009, as cited in Chapman, 2018, p. 7) process of change model, were discussion based. The programme began with discussion about their ideology and what it meant to them as individuals to identify as a member of the organisation in question. This was followed by discussion designed to enable the unpacking and analysis of these beliefs, which in turn led to a period of critical thinking. It was during this latter process that individuals were introduced to and encouraged to think about alternatives to violence. Alongside the sessions, individuals were given the opportunity to complete additional work, leading to (if completed) a University certificate in restorative practices.
39. Twelve individuals took part in the programme, which ran over the course of three years. Of those 12 who participated, the following outcomes were described:

*“Four prisoners successfully completed a certificate in restorative practices. Five others completed one module. Two dropped out. Two transferred to another part of the prison (meaning that they renounced their political status and joined the ordinary prisoners). Four were released. Upon release, one participant was reported to have contacted a community restorative justice project with a view to working there.” (p. 13)*

40. Personal accounts by participants would suggest that the time given in the programme for individuals to reflect upon the ideology to which they had subscribed was valued and not something which had previously been done. Whilst the group did not completely move away from seeing the use of violence as legitimate, the circumstances under which they considered it to be justified were specific and few. As the author reflects, this move appeared to be facilitated through the process of dialogue around which the programme revolved, as at no point within the programme were overt attempts to persuade individuals in that direction made by the facilitators. Whilst the authors conclude that the programme appeared to be “reasonably effective” (p. 16) with this group, whether the same programme would be as effective with a different group at different time, in a different context, is less clear.

## **AFRICA, ASIA AND OCEANIA**

### **AUSTRALIA, NEW SOUTH WALES (CHERNEY, 2018A; 2020)**

41. In recent years, Cherney has published a number of studies evaluating the Proactive Integrated Support Model (PRISM) operating in New South Wales. The voluntary programme, in operation since 2016, is aimed both towards individuals who have been convicted of terrorism-related offences and those who are considered to be at risk of radicalisation. It is conducted in the prison setting, however support continues through the period of individuals re-entering the community on parole. The programme is made up of multi-disciplinary input (including religious input) and tailored – following assessment – to the needs of the individual.

42. Both of Cherney’s papers referenced above report upon interviews conducted with individuals who were either currently or had previously been clients of the programme. Some interviewees were incarcerated and some parolees. Although not reported on here, staff were additionally interviewed.

43. Within Cherney’s (2018a) paper, interviews from 12 individuals were reported. The group was split equally into parolees and inmates. Of the six inmates, five had been convicted of terrorism-related offences. All other participants had been identified as being at risk of radicalisation. Of these 12, all but one individual reported experiencing some kind of benefit as a result of the programme (it should be highlighted, too, that that individual had only recently joined the programme). Themes which emerged included:

- The development of skills which individuals felt helped them cope better in the prison environment, as well as better manage stress and anxiety more broadly
- An expansion of individuals’ religious understanding and knowledge, and the ability to think more critically about the actions they may hear justified in the name of certain religious concepts
- The gaining of insight and facilitation of self-reflection
- Preparation for parole
- The opportunity to engage and be heard – having someone there to talk through issues with

44. Some individuals, whilst indicating that the PRISM programme was helpful, indicated that they were already on the road of disengagement at the point they signed up for the programme. This point may be interesting to explore further in future studies.

45. In Cherney's (2020) paper the opportunity for self-reflection that the programme facilitated was again reported; both in terms of religious belief and more broadly in terms of reflecting upon what combination of factors may have led an individual to developing the offending behaviours. Feedback from one participant in particular would suggest that they felt the programme had enabled them to resist the pull of extremist associates and even go so far as to challenge those who were attempting to radicalise others (in the prison environment).
46. Also worthy of note here is the research published by Cherney and Belton in 2019(b). Again the PRISM programme was under investigation. Progress here was marked through a coding framework designed to log and track (from information recorded within case notes) whether change in various elements of interest (e.g. a change in attitudes/beliefs) had occurred. In essence, qualitative case notes were being converted into quantitative data. One finding that is particularly interesting to note is that as the amount of time an individual had spent engaged in the programme (as measured through the number of visits) increased, so did the degree of change. Causation cannot be established from the analysis performed, but the relationship demonstrated is nonetheless interesting to consider. Important to note, too, in relation to the utility of this method as a means through which to measure change, is the authors' note regarding the importance of developing a method through which to standardise case note taking, such that the information required is available in a consistent manner.

## PAKISTAN (AZAM & FATIMA, 2017)

47. This paper focuses on the de-radicalisation programme employed in the SWAT Valley, Pakistan, for detained militants. The programme is described as being based on the Saudi model<sup>21</sup> and is extended to individuals who "...have not caused bodily harm to others" (p. 1). Quantitative data, in the form of demographic information (extending to information regarding individuals' past occupation, for example) was collected. Further, semi-structured interviews were additionally conducted with 12 militants (some current and some former recipients of the programme) and eight course facilitators and administrators.
48. A particular concern that arose from the study was the militants' level of literacy, and whether the course had been appropriately adapted such that they were able to access and draw meaning from it. This relates particularly to the religious input, which (in contrast to the Saudi model) took the form of lectures and classes, as opposed to dialogue. The authors of the study observed that interaction within the class appeared to minimal (in that few individuals asked questions). Furthermore, they interpreted the finding that, during the interviews, few spoke about their learning from the religious module, as sign of its somewhat poor effectiveness. The authors proposed, too, that alterations could possibly be made to the vocational training offered through considering the skill requirements of the area to which the individual would be returning and responding accordingly. Other points raised by the authors related to the limited human and financial resources available within the programme (this appeared to be particularly in relation to post-release support), as well as fact that the religious clerics involved in the programme tended to be linked to the military which, it was felt, may affect their credibility with militants<sup>22</sup>.

<sup>21</sup> The Saudi model can be found comprehensively described by Boucek (2008) and has been paraphrased here. Within the model, focus is placed on countering what it viewed as individuals' 'corrupt' view of Islam. The programme begins with a Counselling Programme, made up of religious dialogue with clerics, alongside input from a multi-disciplinary team comprised of psychologist, psychiatrists, social scientists and researchers. This latter team also works with offenders' families, in part with the aim to prevent any further radicalisation. This support may be financial (if the incarcerated individual was the breadwinner, for example) or take the form of assistance with children's education. Upon completion of the Counselling Programme, each individual is required to take an exam. If this is passed and the individuals' alteration is considered to be genuine, assuming the individual is eligible for release they are moved to the Care Rehabilitation Centre – the step between prison and release (individuals who do not pass repeat the counselling programme). Input continues here in the form of art therapy programmes and recreational activities. Individuals are then supported as they re-enter the community through, for example, assistance in finding a job and the provision of training.

<sup>22</sup> It is outlined by Boucek (2008, p. 6) that clerics chosen for the Saudi Arabia programme are "...relatively distant..." from the government - the aim being to increase their credibility with offenders



## SRI LANKA (KRUGLANSKI, GELFAND, BÉLANGER, GUNARATNA & HETTIARARCHCHI, 2014; WEBBER ET AL., 2018)

49. As far as can be established, this Sri Lankan programme is the only one for which an experimental approach to the evaluation of outcomes has been able to be applied. Due to circumstance, detainees within one particular centre had not completed the full programme during the time period under investigation and could, as such, serve as a 'control' group. The two studies reported upon here took place concurrently.
50. The programme itself was made up of seven elements (Webber et al., 2018):
- Educational
  - Vocational
  - Psychological
  - Spiritual
  - Recreational
  - Cultural/Family
  - Community
51. Kruglanski et al. (2014) reported that the rehabilitation group consisted of 1906 detainees (1737 of whom were men) from six centres across North Eastern Sri Lanka. All were members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Each individual involved was asked to complete a questionnaire in December 2009 (Time Point 1) and again in September 2010 (Time Point 2). The questionnaire aimed to establish the degree to which individuals felt aligned to and embedded within the organisation ("*organisational embeddedness*"), their attitudes towards the staff involved in the programme ("*positive attitude towards the personnel*") and the degree to which they were willing to employ violence and take up arms for the cause ("*support for armed struggle*"). The 'control' group – consisting of 152 individuals – were given the same questionnaire at the same time points. It should be stressed that there were some differences in the make-up of the groups; namely that individuals in the control group were older (average age of 30.22 years, as compared with 27.54 years in the rehabilitation group) and slightly less educated. Importantly, too, the 'control' group had a higher risk classification.
52. Findings demonstrated that whilst the "*support for armed struggle*" shown by individuals in the rehabilitation group decreased significantly over time, only minimal change in this measure was seen in the 'control' group. The immediate question – as the author's outline – that presents is whether this truly reflects any effect of the rehabilitation programme. Perhaps it's the case that the lower risk group would have shown such change regardless of the programme, whilst conversely the higher risk group may have shown no change, even if they had received the programme? This question was somewhat counteracted by additional data collected by the team from a centre housing the highest risk category detainees. The individuals in this centre had also received the programme, and were provided the same questionnaire in December 2010 and December 2011. Again, findings from this group indicated a reduction (although as the authors describe, this was "...not yet [statistically] significant", p.18) in "*support for armed struggle*" over time. Whilst further investigation is required, this finding adds some support for a significant effect of the programme. If there was little change over time in the medium risk group (with no intervention), then there is no reason to suppose that high risk individuals would show any such change under similar circumstances, either. The fact, therefore, that a declining trend in the highest risk group's "*support for armed struggle*" was observed over a similar time period, but with rehabilitation input, would suggest it is most likely to be the programme that led to the change seen.
53. Regarding Webber et al. (2018), in the first study, 490 individuals formed the rehabilitation group, with 111 individuals – who had received a '*minimal treatment programme*' (p. 4) acting as the 'control' group. Again, these groups differed in age, with the 'control' group having a higher average age (29.18 as compared with 24.97) but lower educational level. This was controlled for however within the analysis conducted.

54. Individuals were again given surveys to complete, this time at 6-monthly intervals (creating an initial and two follow up time points). Questions were concerned with how active and involved individuals and their families were in the organisation ("*embeddedness*"), whether they felt the programme was beneficial ("*attitudes towards de-radicalisation*"), their feelings of significance/ insignificance ("*loss of significance*") and the degree to which they felt violence was justified to meet the ends of the group ("*extremism*"). Of interest within the analysis was the influence of treatment on levels of extremism. Findings demonstrated that by time point 3, those who had received the full rehabilitation programme reported significantly lower levels of extremism.
55. In study two, the focus was on individuals who had previously been through the rehabilitation programme and were currently residing in the community. 179 such individuals were recruited to the study, alongside 144 members of the community who hadn't ever been affiliated with a terrorist group. Again, the groups were not matched along all demographic factors measured, and this again was controlled for within the analysis. The survey was slightly adapted from that previously employed. It again covered the themes of "*attitudes towards de-radicalisation*", "*loss of significance*" and "*extremism*", but this time also explored the activities individuals had been involved in within the rehabilitation programme ("*de-radicalisation program involvement*"), feelings towards the government ("*Positivity toward the Sinhalese and Sri Lankan government*") and whether individuals missed anything about the terrorist group to which they had previously been affiliated ("*LTTE nostalgia*").
56. Analysis was concerned with the influence of involvement in the rehabilitation programme on extremism and the feelings held by individuals about the government. Findings showed that the impact the rehabilitation programme had on extremism was sustained, with individuals who had been through the rehabilitation programme actually showing significantly lower extremism than community members who hadn't been involved with a terrorist group. It is interesting to note however that, whilst most individuals surveyed here had cut ties with previous associates involved in the LTTE, those who had maintained connections showed significantly greater levels of extremism than those who had not. Finally, individuals who had been involved in the programme were found to view the government significantly more positively than the general community members.

## INDONESIA (AGASTIA, PERWITA & SUBEDI, 2020; SUKABDI, 2015)

57. Sukabdi's (2015) paper has been included here although it is not looking at the effectiveness of a specific rehabilitation programme per se. However, the insights provided by the interviewees are interesting to consider. Here, 43 men (31 of whom were currently in prison) were engaged in conversation regarding their behaviour transformation process and aspects relating to rehabilitation – including, for example, what they considered the key elements to be.
58. Whilst there is not the space here to reflect upon all findings, some interesting points to pull out are:
- Their own arrest and learning about the arrest or 'hunting' down of kin were indicated to be a turning point (in terms of behaviour transformation) for many.
  - It was universally felt that "*...sincerity and generosity by others including law enforcement, civil society members, and practitioners becomes the key factors in changing the behavior of terror actors, therefore these are required in designing behavior shaping and transformation process*" (p. 45).
  - Many also reflected that it is simply not possible to apply the same approach to everyone, with 80% agreeing that identifying the needs of each individual before implementing any programme is important.
  - The importance of the religious leaders involved in any rehabilitation being highly knowledgeable was highlighted.
  - Also outlined by some was that input should be holistic (covering both specific and general development activities) and that it include appropriate ongoing follow up.
  - Generally, it was felt that rehabilitation would have been successful if individuals had turned away from violence.

- In terms of what successful outcomes might look like, successful reintegration into their communities and a better understanding of the context of Indonesia ranked highly.
- None liked the term 'de-radicalisation', and scepticism was expressed by the majority too about the aim to change certain aspects of people's ideology.

59. Many of these reflections – such as the fact that individualised, holistic interventions are required, and the importance of the attitude of staff – mirror those discussed in the literature. The last point, regarding the naming of any rehabilitation intervention is particularly interesting, and again can be considered against theoretical discussion within the literature.

60. Agastia et al. (2020) discussed and responded to criticism of the rehabilitation interventions employed within Indonesia, the failings of which it is quoted can often be found attributed to "...a heavy emphasis on ideological conversion and general inadequacy in human and material resources to carry out the technical aspects of the de-radicalisation programme" (p. 3). The particular focus of these authors is on the utilisation of civil society organisations (CSOs) within intervention programmes, and whether establishing more joint working processes may be able to plug some of the current gaps in provision and address the aforementioned concerns.

61. Following a thematic analysis of Indonesia's current de-radicalisation efforts, the authors discuss the potential advantages of utilising CSOs – particularly their independence from government and the impact that has on how they are viewed within communities, and in turn how receptive individuals may be to intervention. This increased trust affords them the ability "...to maintain robust grassroots networks, which assist in the implementation of individual approaches to de-radicalisation" (p. 14). Perceived challenges related both to the need for the two parties concerned (i.e. the government and CSOs) to come to an agreement regarding what de-radicalisation looks like, and for the development of trust between the parties. There was an identified need, too, for a diminishment of scepticism on the half of the government regarding the role CSOs are able to occupy.

62. The authors conclude by proposing a roadmap, the aim of which is to (as quoted directly, from p. 16):

1. *Minimise the trust deficit between government and CSOs*
2. *Increase CSO involvement at all stages of de-radicalisation*
3. *Increase incentives for CSOs to engage in de-radicalisation programmes with maximalist goals*

## **NIGERIA (BARKINDO & BRYANS, 2016)**

63. Barkindo & Bryans (2016) were both involved in the development and implementation of a (prison based) de-radicalisation programme in Nigeria. The programme – the ultimate aim of which was to induce a change in individual's views and beliefs – was piloted in one prison (Kuje medium security prison) within which the violent extremist prisoners were housed within a separate, recently refurbished block. The programme was extended to individuals who were awaiting trial for offences relating to the Terrorism Prevention act, as well as those who has been convicted (indeed, the vast majority of individuals involved in the pilot were awaiting trial). Each individual was assessed to ascertain their risk-related needs and an intervention plan subsequently implemented. The activities encompassed within the programme were broad, from education and vocational training to sport. Incentives were offered for programme participation.

64. The impact of the programme was assessed through establishing (as quoted directly, from p. 18):

1. *Changes in the prisoners' behaviour*
2. *[The prisoners'] Level of engagement with the interventions*
3. *[The] number of institutional incidents*
4. *[The] number of interventions completed*

65. Whilst the authors acknowledge the programme is still in its infancy and ongoing monitoring will be required, early findings would suggest that the risks for many prisoners – as measured through assessment<sup>23</sup> – had lowered. There was a reported, general improvement, too in the relationship between violent extremist prisoners and staff which, in some instances, extended beyond those staff involved directly involved in the programme. Additionally, an improvement in relations between the violent extremist prisoners and the broader prison population was reported.
66. The authors stress however that the real test of the success of the programme will be in the trajectory individuals follow upon their release from prison. And, indeed, when compiling their list of recommendations, the authors highlight the importance of including ongoing support to help individuals reintegrate into the community upon release. Other lessons include the importance of having realistic expectations of the programme in question, assurance of a stable funding stream and reliable methods through which to classify individuals, to ensure that only those for whom the programme is appropriate enter into it.

<sup>23</sup> The assessment tool utilised was one developed specifically for use in the Nigerian prison context, following review of available tools. The tool consists of 47 'indicators', grouped under the headings of "...motivation for committing a violent extremist act; level of commitment to violent extremist acts; personality (attitudes, beliefs), feelings, behaviour; context and intent; background, history and capability; and any risk reduction factors" (Barkindo & Bryans, 2016, p. 13).

## 4. SUPPORT AND SUPERVISION IN THE COMMUNITY

67. Staying for a moment in Nigeria, this section will open with consideration of the work of Clubb & Tapley (2018), within which the role of the broader community is focused upon. Within this work the authors stress the agency of communities, in the form of their collective willingness (or lack thereof) to facilitate the re-integration of an individual. The full discussion will not be repeated here, however what the authors are in essence advocating for is the inclusion of the development of an understanding of the community to which the individual will return to within intervention programmes. If communities are to accept reformed individuals, it is argued that that the individual's disengagement 'script' needs to resonate with them – and, in this respect, de-radicalisation programmes can serve as means through which to facilitate successful reintegration (Clubb & Tapley, 2018). Indeed, similar themes regarding acceptance into community and the importance of considering an individual's wider context are explored by Liem & Weggemans (2018 – please note, this discussion is concerned with a number of high profile individuals, not all of whom were involved in terrorism) and Marsden (2017).
68. The importance of ensuring continuity of support from prison into the community is encapsulated within the recent RAN (2019) working paper. The co-ordination of such support falls to probation services (or Justice Social Work in Scotland), who are required both to manage the risk the individual poses (as necessary to ensure the safety of the community) and support individuals in the process of reintegration (RAN, 2019). In many respects, the balancing of these aspects is akin to the balance between security (in relation to the risk of radicalising others) and rehabilitation that is sought in prison. However, as RAN (2019) again touch upon, the uncontrolled environment of the community naturally brings with it its own requirements and challenges. Similarly, whilst the needs of probation staff – in terms of training and so on – overlap with staff working with individuals involved in violent extremism and terrorism offences in prison, the stresses of the job are different in some respects. RAN (2019) particularly highlight the pressures that fall on staff in relation to the political and social attention placed on individual involved in terrorism offences, and the impact this may have on their decision-making. They highlight concerns, too, that staff may have about their own safety and how to deal with any individual who may try to radicalise them (RAN, 2019).
69. A holistic approach to reintegration underpinned by multi-disciplinary input is advocated (RAN, 2019). Outlined below is an overview from studies which have in some way evaluated or considered risk management strategies employed in the community setting with individuals involved in violent extremism and terrorism offences. Once again, these studies have been presented according to country.

### UNITED KINGDOM

#### ENGLAND & WALES (DISLEY, PARDAL, WEED & REDING, 2016; JONES, 2015)

70. Disley et al.'s (2016) study was concerned with exploring the role of MAPPA (Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements) in managing individuals convicted of terrorism offences in the community. As part of the report, 10 staff – eight of whom were either currently or soon/preparing to be supervising individuals convicted of terrorism offences under MAPPA and two of whom were from the Reducing Reoffending Group based with the National Offender Management Service – were interviewed using a semi-structured approach. It should be stressed that whilst the report was published relatively recently, the interviews themselves took place in 2010. Interviewees were asked to consider the issues and challenges they saw as particularly relevant to working (under MAPPA arrangements) with this group. Following exploration of the literature, two themes also formed the basis of more specific questioning: information sharing and risk assessment. Findings within the report were organised according to information sharing, risk assessment and risk management strategies. Again, responses relating to risk assessment have not been prioritised here.

71. In relation to information sharing, two key considerations emerged: that the sharing of intelligence presents a challenge not previously experienced and, relatedly, that the management of individuals convicted of terrorism offences involves professionals whose input hasn't previously been required. Three reasons as to why interviewees felt that information sharing might be expected to be difficult emerged (as quoted directly, from p. 10):

- *The information is genuinely more sensitive*
- *There is no prior relationship of trust with specialist police units*
- *A culture of secrecy exists among counter terrorist officers*

72. A number of those interviewed put forward the suggestion that sharing information with a smaller group of professionals may ease some of the security concerns, however not all felt such an approach was necessary, with one interviewee highlighting the lack of any data breaches to date and the fact that MAPPA teams are already operating under confidentially arrangements.<sup>24</sup>

73. Opinions regarding the management of individuals convicted of terrorism offences – i.e., whether it would involve the same or different elements as utilised with 'typical' offending – were mixed. The lack of previous professional knowledge upon which to draw was captured within the response of the following interviewee:

*"There isn't a body of knowledge. If we have a sex offender we know exactly the sorts of programmes to avail the people, some of the training, specific work with people who've committed sex offences or domestic violence offences but nobody's got this level of experience [with terrorist cases]." (Interviewee 3, MAPPA Coordinator, Probation Service, Area A). (p.23)*

74. Also recognised – related in this instance to working with individuals convicted of terrorism offences who were Muslim – was the need to consider and be sensitive to cultural and religious values when working with their families.

75. The second study concerned with community provision in England and Wales conducted by Jones (2015) presented reflections regarding working with individuals involved in violent extremism in a team based in London. Key points and themes are summarised next.

## **THE ALLOCATION OF PROBATION OFFICERS TO INDIVIDUALS**

76. At the time of writing, in the service being reflected upon here the allocation of Offender Managers to individuals was 'random', guided largely by practical factors. This meant – to summarise the example provided by the author – that some individuals whose offending was inspired by Al-Qaeda may happen (by chance) to be supported by an Offender Manager who identified as Muslim, whilst others would not. Reflecting upon this, the author outlines that whilst targeted allocation can bring certain benefits, random allocation naturally means that individuals involved in offending are likely to be working with staff who differ from them along a number of personal factors. The development of a good working relationship between individual and Offender Managers may therefore play a broader role in demonstrating the fact that working and building links with individuals who are different in their background and personal beliefs can be a positive thing.

77. Within the service, a dedicated team of specialised Offender Managers had been established to support and co-manage individuals involved in violent extremism alongside 'typical' Offender Managers. This set up, it was felt, ensured a standardised approach to management and – whilst

<sup>24</sup> Within the recent independent review of MAPPA for Terrorist Risk Offenders (Hall, 2020b), the importance of sharing 'live' intelligence was highlighted (Section 5, p. 35). Hall (2020b) proposes that Core Groups – all members of which would have necessary security clearance – be established to manage day to day decision making, with meetings involving the wider group of agencies used to provide general oversight

the extra layer of management could in some sense appear cumbersome – provided balanced weighting to the “...probation and rehabilitative agenda...” (p. 175) within multi-disciplinary meetings.

## **IS THE INDIVIDUAL TELLING THE TRUTH?**

78. A challenge the author reflects upon is the difficulty in knowing when an individual is telling the truth regarding their beliefs, and the obvious impact this has on risk management. Offender Managers are never going to be able to completely verify what an individual is thinking and equally, the individual themselves is never going to be able to categorically prove it – presenting difficulties for both parties.<sup>25</sup> The author outlines that this could cause individuals to downplay certain factors (such as the importance of religion to them, for example) due to the concern that it would be seen as carrying risk. They go on to express concern that the very action of this however (i.e. an individual disowning something that was important in their life as a means through which to satisfy those in a position of authority) could itself carry broader consequences in terms of resettlement.

## **THE USE OF MENTORS**

79. The author reflected positively on the involvement of mentors within the service and the different role they were able to occupy within the process. Whilst outlining that such input hasn't been able to be robustly evaluated due to the small size of the programme, it was made clear that mentoring was made available as an option to individuals, but was reviewed and if necessary removed, if it was not considered to be contributing effectively.

## **CENTRAL MAPPA ARRANGEMENTS**

80. Whilst an issue not necessarily likely to arise in all areas, a point reflected upon by the author was the difficulties which can arise due to the movement of individuals between approved premises in different boroughs across London: specifically, the difficulties in quickly bringing a new MAPPA up to speed. This led to the development of 'central MAPPA' arrangements for individuals involved in violent extremism and terrorism offences, covering the whole city.

<sup>25</sup> The Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill includes the mandatory use of polygraph testing for individuals involved in violent extremism and terrorism offences on licence (Law Society of Scotland, n.d; Ministry of Justice [UK], n.d.[a]). This approach is not however being adopted in Scotland (Hutcheon, 2020).

# EUROPE

## THE NETHERLANDS

### (SCHUURMAN & BAKKER, 2015; VAN DER HEIDE & SCHUURMAN, 2018)

81. Both studies discussed here conducted a process and impact evaluation of the reintegration initiative employed within the Netherlands. The latter study builds on the work of the first and findings will consequently be presented in chronological order of publication. Both conducted a series of semi-structured interviews with staff involved in the programme. Interviews stretched across a period of 12 months in Schuurman and Bakker's (2015) study, and 27 months in van der Heide and Schuurman's (2018) latter study.

### PROCESS EVALUATION (SCHUURMAN & BAKKER, 2015)

82. At the time of this research, the initiative was in its relative infancy and the themes outlined below provide a useful overview of the challenges that can present during the process of setting up a programme -

#### ***"Towards a Specialised Group of Employees" (p.9)***

83. The degree of experience and confidence that had been gained by those staff members implementing the programme was outlined, alongside the greater internal reliance that had been established (staff required less input from the National Co-ordinator for Security and Counter Terrorism, instead able to turn to immediate colleagues within the team for support). That being said, one and a half years after initiation the programme team were not functioning entirely independently, indicating the time that needs to be invested when establishing programmes of this nature.

#### ***"Cooperation with (Government) Partners" (p.9)***

84. The importance of developing good working relationships with external partners was outlined. It was noted however that the notoriety of some individuals involved in violent extremism and terrorism offences had an influence on partners' ability or willingness to assist – for example, a staff member outlined difficulties in securing suitable accommodation for their client, once that client's name had been heard by the providers. The importance of ensuring that other professionals involved in delivering treatment (as well as the core team of probation staff) as part of the programme were also given training regarding the reintegration process was outlined.

#### ***"Inadequate Managerial Support" (p.10)***

85. The probation staff involved in the programme also supported 'typical' offending individuals. The work conducted as part of the reintegration initiative took significantly longer than the support of a 'typical' client would – and, whilst this was anticipated and planned for (at a higher level), it remained somewhat of a point of tension between managers and staff.

#### ***"Slowly Toward a Central Point of Contact" (PP.10-11)***

86. Important within the aim of this project was creating an awareness and recognition of the project both within the probation service and more broadly. The indication at this point in the evaluation was that this was starting to happen, but that more work needed to be done with the Public Prosecution Office, as *"...it had not become second nature for public prosecutors to plead for the imposition of RN oversight or to include the particular measures deemed necessary by RN in their pleas"* (p. 11).



## **“External Influences”**

87. Little attention (in terms of media and political interest) had been paid to the project, like reflecting in part that its existence had not be publicised. Also under this theme was highlighted the difficult balancing act faced between adhering to regulations and promoting reintegration efforts. In the instance detailed, an individual was unable (due to regulations) do things like open a bank account, which in turn created significant challenges for his supporting officer.

## **IMPACT EVALUATION (SCHUURMAN & BAKKER, 2015)**

88. The number of clients included in the programme at the point of evaluation was small, standing at five individuals. Because of the design employed it wasn't possible to conclusively answer if the project had met its aim of reducing the likelihood of individuals' re-offending. However success, as perceived by staff involved in the programme, was able to be ascertained. Of the five clients, two had left for Syria however the circumstances preceding this decision were not clear (i.e. had the individuals been able to dupe their supervisors, or had the move been a more spur of the moment decision, perhaps in response to re-acquaintance with previous extremist contacts?). Of the remaining three however, outcomes appeared more positive. One had been able to settle successfully and renounced his previously held convictions (although staff still held some concerns about his tendency to view things in black/white terms). Another, whilst able to stick successfully to parole conditions, had a harder time settling back into his previous life and hadn't shown signs of cognitive change (i.e. de-radicalisation), although did claim to have shifted in his view regarding the justified use of violence (i.e. was showing signs of disengagement). The final individual received regular monitoring and supervision, as it transpired their degree of extremism was not at the level originally suspected.

89. With regards to overall results seen at the end of this period of implementation, the author's conclusions may prove useful to other countries embarking on the process of implementing programmes:

*If the Dutch program is at all representative for initiatives focused on the re-integration of (former) extremists and terrorists, the lack of clear results after a year and half of work suggests that time and patience are essential resources. Short-term success should not be expected.*  
(p. 12)

90. In relation to both the second (monitoring (former) extremists and terrorists through mandatory probation", p. 12) and third ("[adding] a prevention-focused addition to the Dutch authorities' counterterrorism toolbox", p. 12) goals, improved co-operation with Public Prosecution was highlighted as necessary for them to be fully realised.

## **PROCESS EVALUATION (VAN DER HEIDE & SCHUURMAN, 2018)**

91. At this later time point, a number of positives relating to the programme were identified: for example staff felt working relationships within the team were strong, liked the approach of working in pairs to support extremist clients and appreciated the support available to them through sessions with the psychologist. Also mentioned too, was the positive input brought by the increasing inclusion of theologians.

92. There were challenges too, however. Increases in staffing numbers did not appear to have been commensurate to the increase in the number of individual clients being supervised, with overwork reported as "...a key source of stress and dissatisfaction" (pg. 214). This was somewhat complicated by financial issues that had arisen since the previous evaluation reported on, although it was indicated that efforts were being made to address this. Practical challenges extended to the monitoring of individuals – for example, the fact that information from GPS trackers was not available in real time.

93. In response to reflections provided by interviewees, one practical recommendation put forward by the study authors was to standardise processes concerning the implementation of input relating to ideology. This recommendation was heavily caveated by the authors however, particularly in relation to the observation of one interviewee (who had been with the service since the previously reported evaluation) that ideology appeared to be playing a lesser role in the offending behaviours seen in later as compared with earlier years. Whilst advocating for a systemised approach, they stress that application must be considered in relation to the importance of ideological belief for the individual in question (such that a consistent approach is adopted, but according to the needs of the client).
94. Findings highlighted too some difficulties in relationships with other agencies, particularly in some municipalities. The formation of a separate organisation with similar aims created concern regarding clients playing organisations off against each other, as well as a lack of clarity at times regarding who should be taking the lead in particular circumstances.

### **IMPACT EVALUATION (VAN DER HEIDE & SCHURMAN, 2018)**

95. Findings indicate recidivism rates to be low, with a 4.2% terrorism-related recidivism rate and 5.8% overall recidivism rate. It could be concluded therefore that the programme has achieved its aims – however as the authors outline, caveats apply. These figures, for example, only apply to the period under which an individual is supervised by probation services, as recidivism is not tracked past this point. It must be noted too that a number of individuals included in the programme were awaiting trial (which could naturally have influenced their behaviour) and that others are immediately re-imprisoned after their period of supervision (which again could influence figures). Additionally, many individuals remain under supervision, making it difficult to establish whether any impact of the programme is maintained past the point at which monitoring has ceased.
96. Staff varied in what they considered success to look like (i.e. would it depend on whether the recidivism was terrorism related or not) whilst also acknowledging the difficulty in identifying the direct impact of the programme, amongst other factors which may have influenced the outcome seen. As one staff member expressed:

*“It is impossible to determine whether a client deradicalized or is disengaged because of the work of RN, or as a result of other (external) factors as well. Expectations should not be too high; after all, this is a difficult group of clients” (TER Staff Member 12) (p. 223)*



# OCEANIA

## NEW SOUTH WALES, AUSTRALIA (CHERNEY, 2018B)

97. This study investigated the support required by 'radicalised offenders' to reintegrate successfully into the community. The author interviewed a range of professionals (n=47) who worked with individuals involved in offending, with the majority of the sample made up of Community Corrections Personnel (n=28). It should be stressed that whilst the majority of those interviewed (90%) had some experience of working directly with individuals considered to be radicalised not all of the group did. One family member and a small sample of individuals involved in offending (n=7: n=3 on parole and n=4 inmates) were additionally interviewed, some of whom had been convicted of a terrorism-related offence and some of whom were considered at risk of radicalisation. As the authors acknowledge however, the results presented in the paper primarily reflect the views of professionals, particularly Community Corrections Officers. The themes which emerged from the research are outlined below:

### **THE DEGREE TO WHICH THERE IS A DIFFERENCE IN THE REQUIREMENTS OF RADICALISED AND 'TYPICAL' INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN OFFENDING.**

98. Overall, the general feeling to emerge was that in many respects, the needs of radicalised individuals involved in offending are akin to those of 'typical' individuals, with the approaches adopted by staff consequently similar to those that would typically be utilised. The authors touch upon the diversity of this group of individuals, and that the needs of individuals will naturally vary however according to the degree to which ideological belief motivates them. Somewhat related to the theme concerning staff training outlined below, the Community Corrections Officers interviewed expressed that they felt unsure as to how best to address individuals' ideological beliefs, and indeed if they were always the best individuals to do so.

### **THE INVOLVEMENT OF FAMILIES**

99. Guru (2012) recognised that family members themselves can struggle with having a child charged with a terrorism offences, having to deal with their own sense of stigma and social isolation. In Cherney's paper, the involvement of families is discussed both in relation to matters more linked to security (e.g., the family providing information on any anti-social associates or visiting places for the individual, and so helping to establish who the individual on parole had been in contact with) and reintegration (e.g., their role in helping individuals to secure employment). However, family members expressed uncertainty in terms of how to effectively engage and support the reintegration of family members convicted of terrorism offences.

100. Cherney acknowledged too however, that connection with family was not a positive in all instances; indeed, if the family was the source of an individual's radicalisation, supporting them in distancing themselves from that environment may be a necessary goal.<sup>26</sup> In general if the home environment is not stable and supportive then this is problematic. For example differences in traditional family expectations and those of the wider support network can lead to instability and identity issues.

101. The particular religious and cultural importance of family was also discussed, with it recognised that the involvement of family may be particularly important for individuals involved in offending who are Muslim. This is explained as relating to the importance, within Islam, that is placed on family roles like the mother or the wife; emphasising that positive relationships here may be able to exert positive influence on an individual.

<sup>26</sup> See also the 2014 paper by Shandon Harris-Hogan, "The Importance of Family: The Key to Understanding the Evolution of Jihadism in Australia."

## **THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH CAN ARISE IN RELATION TO INFORMATION SHARING**

102. This theme related to the sharing of intelligence information and the difficulties in doing so – both in terms of what could be shared by intelligence agencies and in turn how any such information could be used by practitioners working with individuals involved in offending, given its often speculative nature and that revealing to the individual in question that certain information is known could compromise police operations. That being said, it was felt by Community Corrections Officers particularly that having intelligence information was important for managing risk.

## **THE TRAINING NEEDS OF STAFF**

103. Many of the interviewees stressed the need for training, specifically with the aim of increasing their knowledge of Islam and understanding of radicalisation. Various suggestions for how such training could be conducted were put forward, including the use of case studies and face-to-face training. The involvement of local Muslim leaders and those involved in Muslim organisations was also suggested.

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE BROADER CONTEXT WITHIN WHICH THE SUPPORT IS BEING PROVIDED**

104. A key feature of this theme was the feeling expressed of working in a “...*highly charged environment*” (p. 14). The inherent political and media interest, could, it was felt, not only place pressure on practitioners but affect the degree to which radicalised individuals involved in offending may be open to engage. Regarding practitioners, some concern was voiced that the broader environment within which Community Correction Officers were working could lead to risk aversion, with them potentially concerned to lessen supervision, for example when assessment would suggest it was warranted, for fear of repercussions if that individual were to reoffend.



## 5. OUTCOME MEASUREMENTS

105. The practical difficulties that are encountered when evaluating the success of an intervention although already touched upon throughout this review – are now going to be focused upon. Recidivism can be found used as measure of success, however concerns about its utility as a measure of the effectiveness of intervention programmes have been expressed (e.g. Clubb & Tapley, 2018; Renard, 2020). For one, the definition of recidivism is not applied uniformly across the world, creating the potential that what is being counted and considered as recidivism in one location is not the same as that being measured in another (for full discussion relating to this point, see Silke & Morrisson, 2020). With that caveat in mind, findings would fairly consistently suggest that recidivism rates in individuals involved in violent extremism and terrorism offences are low, both in contexts within which conflict is still ongoing and those within which it is not (Silke & Morrisson, 2020). Given the data discussed by Silke (2011) which would suggest that recidivism rates are low even in the absence of any rehabilitation input, questions regarding whether this is the best means through which to assess any value brought by rehabilitation programmes have been raised (Renard, 2020). Relatedly, recidivism figures do not in themselves provide any indication as to why a programme may be working (Horgan & Braddock, 2010).<sup>27</sup>
106. Outlined below are findings from studies which have considered ways in which outcomes from interventions could be measured and effectiveness considered.
107. Two sets of authors – Cherney & Belton (2019a) and Gielen (2018) – have utilised the ‘Pro Integration Model’ within their evaluation (PIM; Barrelle, 2015). The PIM is built around 15 themes which emerged following conversations with a number of individuals who had naturally disengaged (i.e., without any intervention) from an extremist group (Barrelle, 2015). These clustered themes led to the creation of five domains, change across which formed the process of disengagement. These domains were ‘Social Relations’, ‘Coping’, ‘Identity’, ‘Ideology’ and ‘Action Orientation’ (Barrelle, 2015, p. 10). Core to the process of disengagement was, as the author expresses, “...engagement somewhere else”; in other words, the process of reconnecting into society (Barrelle, 2015, p.10). Thus, within the model, each domain was in turn split into three levels, according to the degree of societal engagement shown (Barelle, 2015). Within each of these levels, examples of potential patterns of behaviour which may be exhibited are provided. It should be stressed that, as outlined by the author, the resultant model of disengagement was not intended to be prescriptive, nor was it expected that an individual’s progression would be linear in nature, or that individuals would necessarily be at the same ‘level’ of societal engagement within each domain (Barrelle, 2015). It must also be highlighted that the model itself was not developed as an outcome measurement tool. However – as Cherney and Belton (2019a) discuss – through providing a model of the disengagement process, PIM presents a means through which change over time can be considered, and outcome aims established.
108. Whilst utilising the same model as a means through which to consider outcomes, the two sets of authors had slightly different focuses. Cherney & Belton (2019a) investigated the use of the PIM as a means through which to track individuals’ progression within a specific intervention (PRISM), whilst Gielen’s (2018, p. 3) focus was on programme theory, and considering the means through which a better understanding of “...what works, for whom, how and in what circumstances...” could be gained.
109. Cherney & Belton (2019a)<sup>28</sup> collected information from multiple data sources including

<sup>27</sup> Bissett and Gilman’s (2016) provide 5 step approach to evaluating behaviour change interventions

<sup>28</sup> Cherney & Belton (2019b) adopted a similar approach, using information only from case notes, and not explicitly using the PIM model. The parameters of interest (e.g. change in attitude/beliefs) were decided upon, and a coding framework developed to quantify in a sense the qualitative information held within case notes, regarding individuals’ progress. This was then used with information regarding factors such as an individual’s time in the programme, to look at relationships between the degree of change and time in the programme (for example).

programme reports, case notes and through interviewing staff. The authors developed a coding system to log the presence and status of each of the components encapsulated within each domain of the PIM: namely, whether the component of interest was not present (3), was present and had not shown improvement (2) or was present and had shown improvement (1). If a certain component was not relevant to an individual, '0' was logged. The type of behaviours that might be expected to be seen within each component of each domain were discussed and consensus reached prior to the commencement of coding. Using this method, the authors were able to see where progression had been made, and how progress varied between the three case studies. Within each case study, not all domains reached the level of inter-rater reliability required for inclusion in the study. Whilst only a very small sample was considered here, this is potentially worth bearing in mind as if the method is highly subjective, this could affect its practicability.

110. Gielen's (2018) work was interested in gaining an understanding of exit programmes for female jihadists, however the approach could be transferred to other groups. The author is proposing here a method through which a better understanding of the mechanisms of interventions could be gained and, more specifically, what it is about a particular intervention that works in a particular circumstance, for a particular individual. To do that, they propose a multiple case study style approach through which patterns can begin to be detected and pieced together; for example, establishing what mechanisms may be most effective for individuals in one context, and what might be most effective of individuals in another context. They term the proposed analysis process 'C-M-O' analysis: the 'C' standing for context, 'M' for mechanisms and 'O' for outcomes, which could include consequences which were unintended. Contextual information was broad, encompassing detail relating to the individual themselves – for example, their age and motivation for offending – and the environment being operated in, for example information regarding the co-ordination of multi-agency input (see Gielen, 2018, p. 10 Box 1 for extended examples). The 'M' part of the analysis was concerned with capturing the mechanisms which the intervention aspects applied were aiming to activate (the use of mentoring may be utilised with the aim of increasing an individual's empathy and ability to reflect upon their actions, for example; Gielen, 2018). Finally, the measurement of outcomes allowed for consideration of an individual's progress, in relation to the mechanisms promoted through intervention and their specific context. In the context of the study, one indicator of 'success' was whether the individual involved had made any further attempts to travel. Of additional interest however was the degree to which an individual had disengaged, for which the PIM was utilised (Gielen, 2018). For the evaluation to be effective, the authors anticipate that information regarding an individual will need to be collated from various sources, led by the aims of the evaluation. They outline, too, that such analysis could also be performed for individuals who only had punitive sanctions for example (the example given within the paper being the removal of an individual's passport to prevent them travelling) which could potentially allow for some comparison between individuals who did and did not receive intervention input.
111. In some contrast to this approach, Horgan and Braddock (2010) discuss use of Multiattribute Utility Technology (MAUT)<sup>29</sup>. MAUT, the authors discuss, can be used both as a method through which to tweak and improve programmes, but also as a means through which to establish which programme from the models available is going to be the best choice, according to the desired aims of those implementing it and the resources available to them. The process involves the identification – through discussion with stakeholders – of attributes (i.e., things they want to the programme to achieve), and the hierarchical arrangement of those into a 'value tree' (p. 283). For this method to be used to compare programmes for individuals involved in violent extremism and terrorism offences, a standardised values tree would need to be created, so as to allow for the evaluation of all programmes according to the same points of reference. Full details of this process are provided by the authors (Horgan & Braddock, 2010, p. 282-285).

<sup>29</sup> The process itself was developed by Edwards and Newman (as cited in Horgan and Braddock, p. 282).

## 6. LIMITATIONS OF REVIEW

112. This review has focused on tertiary interventions, targeted towards those who have already been involved in violent extremism. Within risk management measures – supervision, intervention, monitoring, and victim safety planning – this review is largely concerned with intervention and supervision. Therefore it does not include observational or security related measures (e.g. monitoring) or victim safety measures. As outlined within the review, the number of published studies concerned with evaluating such interventions is small and – in the main – those available have included small sample sizes. There is, as has been acknowledged within the literature, a clear need for further information regarding the impact of interventions. This, in turn, may need to respond to the altering violent extremist and terrorist population - for example, the rise seen in recent years in the number of women convicted (Basra & Neumann, 2020a) and the increase in the number of individuals identified as extreme right wing (Basra & Neumann, 2020a). Progress in this field, too, is linked with consideration of how outcomes can be most effectively measured and, relatedly, the types of research which can feasibly be conducted. Additionally, as risk management is inextricably linked to risk assessment, progress in the latter is highly likely to inform the former.
113. The fact that a number of the papers considered within this review have been published within this or recent years is encouraging and suggests that interventions for individuals involved in violent extremism and terrorism offences is a current areas of focus. Due to time constraints, it was not possible during the preparation of this review to reach out to academics and others working in the field, which may have yielded information regarding any projects currently underway and/or provided access to unpublished studies. As a combined consequence, it is fully expected that this review may need to be updated within a relatively short time-frame, in response to additional emerging evidence. Again, due to the constraints under which the review was prepared, a quality check for the studies included wasn't able to be established.
114. Information regarding the population of individuals involved in violent extremism and terrorism offences across Great Britain was gleaned from a publically available source. This source did not break down the data according to nation and, as such, it was not possible to extract information relating specifically to Scotland. As far as can be established, no studies regarding the implementation of tertiary interventions with a Scottish sample has been published to date.

***The fact that a number of the papers considered within this review have been published within this or recent years is encouraging and suggests that interventions for individuals involved in violent extremism and terrorism offences is a current areas of focus.***

## 7. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE

115. This review set out to provide an overview of current understanding regarding the efforts employed to manage the risk of individuals involved in violent extremism and terrorism offences. There is still much to be learnt about working with this group: particularly in relation to the effectiveness of interventions and indeed how effectiveness might be most appropriately measured. It is a group, too, which information considered here would suggest to be highly diverse and – as the review presented by Basra & Neumann (2020a) highlights – one which is changing over time. The fact, however, that much of the literature referred to within this review has either been published within this or in recent years suggests that it is a growing area, and one which is of active interest.
116. Whilst limited evidence is available, based on what is, a number of initial recommendations can be put forward with practice implications –
- a)** In terms of prison management techniques (i.e., operational demands) there are clearly benefits and drawbacks to each approach (i.e., segregation, dispersed in mainstream, mixed). Considerations need to be focused around balancing reducing risk of radicalisation with the rights of the individual and rehabilitation.
  - b)** Staff working with individuals involved in violent extremism and terrorism offences need appropriate training and ongoing access to appropriate support networks (e.g. supervision). Concerns regarding potential risks to personal safety, or attempts to radicalise staff also need to be considered (RAN, 2019). Interventions and supervision need to operate within a culture that is conducive to rehabilitation. Training should be responsive to practitioner needs but also mindful of an ever-developing evidence base. Partnership-working plays a key role in managing risk and therefore multi-agency training across police, social work, prison and other contributing partners may facilitate understanding and multi-agency collaboration and appreciation of roles and responsibilities.
  - c)** Information sharing between agencies is always important but it is even more so in instances of managing radicalisation or terrorism. There may be instances where intelligence could provide crucial information relevant to meaningful assessment and risk management. As such situations may occur where national security issues rub against effective individual risk management. Agreements around sharing information may need to be in place to effectively and safely working in partnerships. Practitioners may need to access intelligence (following appropriate security clearance), and as such this may involve and bring specialist units into resources like MAPPA; which means working with new organisational cultures, processes and roles. Hall (2020b) suggests the formation of a Core Group of professionals (who have appropriate security clearance), within which decision-making is concentrated, with wider meetings providing oversight.
  - d)** In relation to monitoring change, practitioners need to be able to distinguish between religiosity and radicalisation, as well as being able to recognise a broad spectrum of ideological beliefs. Intervention structure and design all needs to consider the diversity within individuals involved in violent extremism and terrorism offences; both in terms of demographic characteristics and motivation for the offending. A 'one size fits all' approach seems unlikely to work.
  - e)** Similar to assessment principles, intervention needs to consider what is the behaviour being 'intervened' (i.e. de-radicalisation, disengagement). This shapes what outcomes are being looked for, e.g. cognitive change, behavioural change. It may be that disengagement appears more realistic with the aim being alternative expressions (non-violent) of ideologies.



**f)** Disengagement interventions may include, to quote the UNODC (2016, Chapter 5, p. 75), a variety of aspects such as "...psychological counselling and support; cognitive-behavioural programmes; social work interventions; faith-based debate and dialogue<sup>19</sup>; education; vocational training; creative therapies; physical therapies (e.g. yoga, sport, exercise); family activity; and social, cultural and recreation." A particular focus on religious or ideological element seems integral to the intervention with consideration of the need to challenge justifications for violence based on religion.

**g)** Outcome evaluation of interventions will prove to be difficult. For example, establishing experimental conditions is extremely difficult. Gathering detailed, multi-source feedback is crucial, as is understanding individual context. As Gielen (2018) highlights the approach may not be about finding what programme works best but rather about gaining a theoretical understanding of what might work for who, when, and in what situation. Furthermore it seems likely that short-term changes might be small, and as such an approach of patience and time is necessary. The Pro-Integration model (PIM; Barelle, 2015) offers a model of disengagement which may have the potential to act as a means through which to monitor and assess change over time (Cherney & Belton, 2019a; Gielen, 2018). Further, through adopting underpinning principles of individuality and recognising and understanding context, the C-M-O analysis proposed by Gielen (2018) offers a potential means through which to establish an understanding of what works for whom. Additionally, Bissett and Gilman (2016) offer a 5-step approach to designing and evaluating behaviour change interventions which offers utility when considering such interventions.

**h)** The limited evidence of intervention success points to the importance of factors like understanding identity, finding alternatives to violence, accepting religiosity, providing a space for reflection, and self-development. Regarding finding alternatives to violence it appears to be about directing the belief in ideology to another method, or rather meeting such needs in alternative manners; potentially drawing parallels with existing intervention frameworks like the Good Lives Model (Ward & Brown, 2004). The behaviour of staff may also play a role in potential intervention success; with evidence of a need for a non-judgemental and exploratory approach, sincerity and generosity, and religious understanding (with some evidence of interventions using religious leaders).

**i)** In terms of existing interventions the literature is at a stage where further exploration and testing is necessary. Models like PRISM (Australia) shows some promise. Outcome evaluations have yet to be published for either of the tertiary programmes operating within the UK, however there is an indication that such an evaluation is being developed in relation to HII, and a review of Prevent appears to be in the pipeline. However at this time there is some uncertainty regarding exactly what this review will focus on, and so it's usefulness in relation to outcome evaluation is yet to be clarified. The programme in Sri-Lanka used a particularly large sample (when compared to other studies) and its consideration of multiple dimensions may provide a useful framework educational, vocational, psychological, spiritual, recreational, cultural/family, community. However the generalisability to other ideologies, cultures and geopolitical contexts would obviously require an approach of caution.

**j)** In relation to supervision it is clear that community understanding and support networks play an important role in supporting community reintegration. As such there may be some important links to the desistance literature that can be made, i.e. in terms of increasing an individual's social bonds and ties to a community (e.g. Morris, Gerber, & Menard, 2011).

**k)** Training of those involved in community management is likely to be similar to those working in prison, e.g. assessment methods, different ideologies, etc. However community staff will also have to deal with political and social attention around their cases. It is worth being mindful that media scrutiny is likely to be extremely relevant to these types of cases.

**l)** There is some evidence of specialist staff being preferred as a service approach – or rather this is likely to happen as a service develops. This is likely to draw some parallels with those who work effectively with violence, sexual violence or intimate partner violence. Each area requires staff to have the necessary skills, knowledge and training to feel competent. This extends to the need for robust supervision of staff so that they feel supported around any potential concerns relating to safety, safe discussion and radicalisation. How supervising workers are allocated could be a consideration for services, with arguments for either specified allocation or random allocation. The latter may bring the additional benefits of exposing convicted individuals to a more diverse set of practitioners in terms of differing personal factors and narratives. What is imperative is the cohesiveness within teams, and paired workers has shown some success in certain England and Wales services.

**m)** Practitioners need to remain reflective and mindful of proportionate practice. Working in this area appears to be particularly sensitive to risk aversive practice (which is perfectly understandable when considering the potential consequences of offending / re-offending). However there is a need to be focused on the guiding principles of FRAME (RMA, 2011) in terms of proportionate, evidence-based practice (acknowledging that this is limited but growing at the moment) which is both collaborative and respectful of balancing rights. More generally consideration could be given to how proportionality, in particular, could underpin an approach to the risk management of individuals involved in radicalisation, violent extremism and/or terrorism offences. There is the possibility that a triaged approach may help to ensure that individuals receive a responsive and tailored input, where risk management measures can be targeted at the relevant behaviours accordingly. For example it would be expected that a more in depth and intensive response would be required where the risk management is focused on potential acts of terrorism, in comparison to concerns regarding radicalisation.

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